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Abstract
One objective of distributed artiﬁcial intelligence research is to build systems that
are capable of cooperative problem solving. To this end, a number of implementation-
oriented models of cooperative problem solving have been developed. However, math-
ematical models of social activity have focussed only on limited aspects of the cooperative
problem solving process: no mathematical model of the entire process has yet been de-
scribed. In this paper, we rectify this omission. We present a preliminary model that
describes the cooperative problem solving process from recognition of the potential for
cooperation through to team action. The model is formalised by representing it as a the-
ory in a quantiﬁed multi-modal logic. A key feature of the model is its reliance on the
twin notions of commitments and conventions; conventions (protocols for monitoring com-
mitments) are formalised for the ﬁrst time in this paper. We comment on the generality
of the model, outline its deﬁciencies, and suggest some possible reﬁnements and other
future areas of research.
1 Introduction
Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence (DAI) is concerned with all forms of social activity in sys-
tems composed of multiple computational agents [1]. An important form of interaction in
such systems is cooperative problem solving (CPS), which occurs when a group of logically de-
centralized agents choose to work together to achieve a common goal. Relevant examples
include a group of agents moving a heavy object, playing a symphony, building a house, and
writing a joint paper. As these examples indicate, CPS is a common and important process
in human societies, and there is increasing evidence to support the claim that it will be sim-
ilarly important in future computer systems. A number of models of the CPS process have
been devised by DAI researchers. Some of these models represent frameworks for imple-
menting CPS systems, and for managing cooperative activities in such systems at run-time
(e.g., [15, 5]). Other, more formal models have been developed in an attempt to characterise
various aspects of CPS (e.g., [10, 8, 17]).
As is the case in mainstream AI, the differing motivations and approaches of formalists
and system builders has meant that there has been relatively little cross-fertilisation between
the two areas. The former camp has concentrated on isolated aspects of the CPS process,
whereas work in the latter camp has concentrated on devising protocols for the entire CPS
process. However, the key assumptions and design decisions of implementation-oriented
1CPS models tend to be buried deep inside the associated software; this can make it difﬁcult
to extract general principles or results from implementations.
This paper goes some way to bridging the gap between theory and practice in DAI. In §4,
we develop a four-stage model of CPS, which we make precise by expressing it as a theory
in a quantiﬁed multi-modal logic. The development of this model was driven by an analysis
of CPS in both natural and artiﬁcial systems; the result is a theory that is accessible to both
formalists and system builders. For formalists, the model represents a preliminary attempt
to capture the properties of CPS in a mathematical framework. For system builders, the
model can serve as a top-level speciﬁcation of a CPS system, which, we believe, can inform
the development of future DAI applications. The model deals with a number of issues that
have hitherto been neglected by DAI theorists; for example, it considers the process by which
an agent recognises the potential for cooperation, and begins to solicit assistance. Note that
although we have attempted to develop a model that deals with CPS from beginning to end,
we do not claim that our model is the ﬁnal word on the subject; it would not be possible to
present, in such a short paper, a theory that dealt with all aspects of a process as complex as
CPS (see §5).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following section presents an
overview of the formal framework used to represent the model. In §3, the notions of commit-
ments and conventions, which play a key role in our model, are discussed and subsequently
formalised; the model of CPS is then developed in §4. Some conclusions are presented in §5.
2 A Formal Framework
This section develops the formal framework in which the model of CPS will be expressed.
This framework is a new quantiﬁed multi-modal logic, which both draws upon and extends
the work described in [3, 13, 18]. Unfortunately, space restrictions prevent us relating the
logic to those developedby other researchers; detailsmay be found in the associated technical
report [19].
Informally, the operators of the language have the following meanings. The operator true
is a logical constant for truth. (Bel i ϕ) and (Goal i ϕ) mean that agent i has a belief, or goal of
ϕ respectively. The = operator is usual ﬁrst-order equality. The ∈ operator allows us to relate
agents to groups of agents; it has the expected set-theoretic interpretation, so (i ∈ g) means
that the agent denoted by i is a member of the group denoted by g.T h e(Agts α g) operator
means that the group denoted by g are precisely the agents required to perform the actions
in the action sequence denoted by α.T h eA operator is a path quantiﬁer: Aϕ means that ϕ is
a path formula that is satisﬁed in all the futures that could arise from the current state1.T h e
operators ¬ (not) and ∨ (or) have classical semantics, as does the universal quantiﬁer ∀;t h e
remaining classical connectives and existential quantiﬁe ra r ea s s u m e dt ob ei n t r o d u c e da s
abbreviations, in the obvious way. (Happens α) is a path formula that means that the action α
happens next; α;α′ means the action α is immediately followed by α′; α|α′ means either α
or α′ happen next; ϕ? is a test action, which occurs if ϕ is ‘true’ in the current state; α∗ means
the action α iterated.
Syntax
Deﬁnition 1 The language contains the following symbols: the propositional connectives ¬
1There is a distinction made in the language between path and state formulae: state formulae are evaluated
with respect to the ‘current state’ of the world, whereas path formulae are evaluated with respect to a course of
events. The well-formed formulae of the language are identiﬁe dw i t ht h es e to fs t a t ef o r m u l a e[ 6 ] .
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Figure 1: Syntax
(not) and ∨ (or), and universal quantifier ∀; the operator symbols Bel, Goal, Happens, Agts, ∈,
=,
v,a n dA;ac o u n t a b l es e tPred of predicate symbols --- each symbol P ∈ Pred is associated
with a natural number called its arity, given by arity(P);ac o u n t a b l es e tConst of constant
symbols, the union of the mutually disjoint sets ConstAg (agent constants), ConstAc (action
sequence constants), ConstGr (group constants), and ConstU (other constants); a countable set
Var of variable symbols, the union of the mutually disjoint sets VarAg, VarAc, VarGr and VarU;
the punctuation symbols ), (,‘ ⋅’ and ‘,’; and finally, the action constructor symbols ‘;’, ‘|’, ‘?’
and ‘∗’.
Deﬁnition 2 A term is either a constant or a variable; the set of terms is Term.T h es o r to fa
term is either Ag, Ac, Gr or U;i fs is a sort then Terms = Consts ∪ Vars;t h u sτs ∈ Terms.
The syntax of (well-formed) formulae (
hƒmla
i)o ft h el a n g u a g ei sd e ﬁned in Figure 1. Note
that we demand that a predicate P is applied to arity(P) terms.
Semantics
It is assumed that the world may be in any of a set S of states.As t a t etransition is caused by
the occurrence of a primitive action (or event): the set of all primitive actions is DAc.F r o ma n y
3state, there is at least one — and perhaps many — possible actions, and hence resultant states.
The binary relation R on S is used to represent all possible courses of world history: (s,s′) ∈ R
iff the state s could be transformed into state s′ by the occurrence of a primitive action that
is possible in s. Clearly, R will branch inﬁnitely into the future from every state. A labelling
function Act maps each arc in R to the action associated with the transition. The world is
populated by a non-empty set DAg of agents.Agroup over DAg is simply a non-empty subset
of DAg; the set of all such groups is DGr. Agents and groups may be related to one-another
via a simple (typed) set theory. Agents have beliefs and goals, and are (idealized) reasoners.
The beliefs of an agent are given by a beliefaccessibilityrelation on S in the usual way; similarly
for goals. Every primitive action α is associated with an agent, given by Agt(α). Finally, the
world contains other individuals given by the set DU. A complete deﬁnition of the language
semantics will now be given. First, paths (a.k.a. fullpaths) will be deﬁned: a path represents
a possible course of events through a branching time structure.
Deﬁnition 3 If S is a non-empty set and R is a total binary relation on S then a path over S,R
is an infinite sequence (su : u ∈ IN) such that ∀u ∈ IN, su ∈ S and (su,s u+1)∈R.T h es e to fa l l
paths over S,R is given by paths(S,R). The head of a path p = (s0,…) is its first element s0,a n d
is given by hd(p).
Next, we present the technical apparatus for dealing with the denotation of terms.
Deﬁnition 4 The domain of quantification, D,i sDAg ∪( D∗
Ac)∪DGr ∪ DU,( w h e r eS∗ denotes
the set of non-empty sequences over S). If n ∈ IN, then the set of n-tuples over D is Dn.
An interpretation for constants, I, is a sort-preserving bijection I : Const → D.A v a r i a b l e
assignment, V, is a sort-preserving bijection V : Var → D.
The function [[…]] I,V gives the denotation of a term relative to I,V.
Deﬁnition 5 If τ ∈ Term,t h e n[[τ]] I,V is I(τ) if τ ∈ Const,a n dV(τ) otherwise. Reference to I,V
will usually be suppressed.
Deﬁnition 6 Am o d e l ,M,i sas t r u c t u r e :
hS,R,DAg,D Ac,D Gr,D U,Act,Agt,B,G,I,Φ
i
where: Sisanon-empty setofstates;R ⊆ S×SisatotalbinaryrelationonS; DAg isanon-empty
set of agents; DAc is a non-empty set of actions; DGr is the set of groups over DAg; DU is a
non-empty set of other individuals; Act : R → DAc associates a primitive action with each
arc in R; Agt : DAc → DAg gives the agent of each primitive action; B : DAg → powerset(S × S)
associates a transitive, euclidean, serial belief accessibility relation with every agent in DAg;
G : DAg → powerset(S×S) associates a serial goal accessibility relation with everyagent in DAg,
such that ∀i ∈ DAg, G(i)⊆B(i); I : Const → D is an interpretation for constants; and finally
Φ : Pred× S →
S
n∈IN Dn gives the extension of each predicate symbol in each state, such that
∀P ∈ Pred, ∀n ∈ IN, ∀s ∈ S,i farity(P) = n then Φ(P, s)⊆Dn (i.e., Φ preserves arity).
The semantics of the language are deﬁned via the satisfaction relation, ‘|=’, which holds
between interpretation structures and formulae. For state formulae, an interpretation struc-
ture is a triple
hM,V,s
i,w h e r eM is a model, V is a variable assignment and s is a state. For
path formulae, an interpretation structure is a triple
hM,V,p
i,w h e r ep is a path. The rules
deﬁning the satisfaction relation are given in Figure 2 (state formulae) and Figure 3 (path for-
mulae). The rules make use of some syntactic abbreviations. First, we write occurs(α,u,v ,p)
if action α occurs between ‘times’ u,v ∈ IN on the (possibly ﬁnite) path p:
4hM,V,s
i |= true
hM,V,s
i |= (P τ1,…,τn) iff
h[[τ1]],…,[[τn]]
i ∈Φ ( P, s)
hM,V,s
i |= (Bel i ϕ) iff ∀s′∈S, if (s,s′) ∈ B([[i]]) then
hM,V,s′
i |= ϕ
hM,V,s
i |= (Goal i ϕ) iff ∀s′∈S, if (s,s′) ∈ G([[i]]) then
hM,V,s′
i |= ϕ
hM,V,s
i |= (Agts α g) iff agents(α) = [[g]]
hM,V,s
i |= (τ1 = τ2) iff [[τ1]] = [[τ2]]
hM,V,s
i |= (i ∈ g) iff [[i]] ∈ [[g]]
hM,V,s
i |= (α
v α′) iff actions([[α]]) ⊆ actions([[α′]])
hM,V,s
i |= Aϕ iff ∀p ∈ paths(S,R), if hd(p) = s then
hM,V,p
i |= ϕ
hM,V,s
i |= ¬ϕ iff
hM,V,s
i ⁄ |= ϕ
hM,V,s
i |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff
hM,V,s
i |= ϕ or
hM,V,s
i |= ψ
hM,V,s
i |= ∀x ⋅ ϕ iff
hM,V †
fx
 
  d
g,s
i |= ϕ
for all d ∈ D s.t. x and d are of the same sort
Figure 2: State Formulae Semantics
hM,V,p
i |= (Happens α) iff ∃u ∈ IN s.t. occurs(α,0,u,p)
hM,V,p
i |= ϕ iff
hM,V,hd(p)
i |= ϕ (where ϕ is a state formula)
hM,V,p
i |= ¬ϕ iff
hM,V,p
i ⁄ |= ϕ
hM,V,p
i |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff
hM,V,p
i |= ϕ or
hM,V,p
i |= ψ
hM,V,p
i |= ∀x ⋅ ϕ iff
hM,V †
fx
 
  d
g,p
i |= ϕ
for all d ∈ D s.t. x and d are of the same sort
Figure 3: Path Formulae Semantics
occurs(α,u,v ,(s0,…)) iff [[α]] = (α1,…,αn),n≤ v − u, and ∀w ∈
f1,…,n
g,
Act(su+w−1,s u+w) = αw (where α ∈ TermAc)
occurs(α;α′,u,v ,p) iff ∃w ∈
fu,…,v
g s.t. occurs(α,u,w ,p) and
occurs(α′,w ,v ,p)
occurs(α|α′,u,v ,p) iff occurs(α,u,v ,p) or occurs(α′,u,v ,p)
occurs(ϕ?,u,v ,p) iff
hM,V,hd(p)
i |= ϕ
occurs(α∗,u,v ,p) iff ∃w1,…,w x ∈ IN s.t. (w1 =0 ) and (w1 <⋅⋅⋅<wx)
and ∀y ∈
f1,…,x
g,occurs(α,w y,w y+1,p)
Two functions are required, that return all the primitive actions referred to in an action se-
quence, and the agents required for an action term, respectively.
actions((α1,…,αn))
def =
fα1,…,αn
g
agents(α)
def =
fi |∃ α′∈actions([[α]]) s.t. Agt(α′) = i
g (where α ∈ TermAc)
Some derived operators
A number of derived operators will now be introduced. First, the usual connectives of linear
temporal logic: ϕ
U ψ means ϕ is satisﬁed until ψ becomes satisﬁed;
￿ϕ means ϕ is eventually
satisﬁed; ϕ means ϕ is always satisﬁed. These connectives are used to build path formulae.
5The path quantiﬁer E is the dual of A;t h u sEϕ means ϕ is a path formulae satisﬁed on at least
one possible future.
ϕ
U ψ
def = (Happens (¬ψ?;ϕ?)∗;ψ?)
￿ϕ
def = true
U ϕ
ϕ
def = ¬
￿¬ϕ
Eϕ
def = ¬A¬ϕ
(Singleton gi ) means g is a singleton group with i as the only member. (Agt α i) means i is the
only agent of action α.
(Singleton gi )
def = ∀j ⋅( j ∈ g)⇒( j = i)
(Agt α i)
def = ∀g ⋅( Agts α g)⇒( Singleton gi )
To represent an action α achieving ag o a lϕ, we introduce a derived operator Achieves.
(Achieves αϕ )
def = A((Happens α)⇒( Happens α;ϕ?))
We will have a number of occasions to write A(Happens α),( a c t i o nα occurs next in all altern-
ative futures), and A¬(Happens α) (action α does not occur next in any alternativefuture), and
so we introduce abbreviations for these.
(Does α)
def = A(Happens α)( Doesn’t α)
def = A¬(Happens α)
Knowledge is deﬁned as true belief, rather than by introducing it as yet another primitive
modality.
(Know i ϕ)
def = ϕ ∧( Bel i ϕ)
We also ﬁnd it convenient to use the notions of mutual mental states. Although we recog-
nise that such states are idealised, in that they are not realisable in systems which admit the
possibility of failed communication, they are nevertheless valuable abstraction tools for un-
derstanding multi-agent systems. The mutual belief of ϕ in a group of agents g is written
(M-Bel g ϕ); the mutual goal of ϕ in g is written (M-Goal g ϕ), and the mutual knowledge of ϕ
is written (M-Know g ϕ).W ed e ﬁne mutual mental states as ﬁxed points.
(M-Bel g ϕ)
def = ∀i ⋅( i ∈ g)⇒( Bel i ϕ ∧( M-Bel g ϕ))
(M-Goal g ϕ)
def = ∀i ⋅( i ∈ g)⇒( M-Bel g (Goal i ϕ))
(M-Know g ϕ)
def = ϕ ∧( M-Bel g (M-Know g ϕ))
3 Commitments, Conventions, and Intentions
The key mental states that control agent behaviour are intentions and joint intentions — the
former deﬁne local asocial behaviour, the latter control social behaviour [2]. Intentions are
important as they provide both the stability and predictability (through the notion of com-
mitment) that is needed for social interactions, and the ﬂexibility and reactivity (through the
mechanisms by which commitments are monitored) that are required to deal with a chan-
ging environment. Previous attempts to formalize (joint) intentions have made no distinc-
tion between a commitment and its underlying convention; we clearly distinguish the two
concepts: a commitment is a pledge or a promise; a convention is a means of monitoring a com-
mitment — it speciﬁes both the conditions under which a commitment might be abandoned,
and how an agent should behave, should such a circumstance arise [8].
6Commitments have a number of important properties (see [8] and [3, pp217–219] for a
discussion), but the most important is that commitments persist: having adopted a commit-
ment, we do not expect an agent to drop it until, for some reason, it becomes redundant. The
conditions under which a commitment can become redundant are speciﬁed in the associated
convention — examples include the motivation for the goal no longer being present, the goal
being achieved, and the realization that the goal will never be achieved [3].
When a group of agents are engaged in a cooperative activity, they have a joint commit-
ment to the overallaim, as wellas individual commitments to the speciﬁc tasks thatthey have
been assigned. This joint commitment is parameterised by a social convention, which iden-
tiﬁes the conditions under which the joint commitment can be dropped, and also describes
how the agent should behave towards fellow team members. For example, if an agent drops
its joint commitment because it believes that the goal will never be attained, then it is part of
the notion of ‘cooperativeness’ inherent in joint action that it informs fellow team members
of its change of state. In this context, social conventions provide general guidelines, and a
common frame of reference in which agents can work. By adopting a convention, every agent
knows what is expected both of it, and of every other agent, as part of the collective working
towards the goal, and knows that every other agent has a similar set of expectations.
Formally, we deﬁne a convention as a set of rules, each rule consisting of a re-evaluation
condition ρ and a goal γ : if ever an agent believes ρ to be true, then it must adopt γ as a goal,
and keep this goal until the commitment becomes redundant.
Deﬁnition 7 A convention, c, is an indexed set of pairs: c =
f(ρk,γk)|k ∈
f1,…,l
g
g,w h e r eρk
is a re-evaluation condition, and γk is a goal, ∀k ∈
f1,…,l
g.
Joint commitments have a number ofparameters. First, a joint commitment is held by a group
g of agents. Second, joint commitments are held with respect to some goal ϕ; this is the state
of affairs that the group is committed to bringing about. Third, joint commitments are held
relative to a motivation, which characterises the justiﬁcation for the commitment. They also
have a pre-condition, which describes what must initially be true of the world in order for the
commitment to be held. For example, in most types of joint commitment, we do not expect
participating agents to initially believe that the object of the commitment, ϕ, is true. Finally,
a joint commitment is parameterised by a convention c. Joint commitment is then informally
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition: (Joint commitments) Ag r o u pg is jointly committed to goal ϕ with
respect to motivation ψ, pre-condition pre, and convention c iff: (i) pre-condition
pre is initially satisﬁed; and (ii) until the termination condition is satisﬁed, every
agent in g either (a) has a goal of ϕ; or (b) believes that the re-evaluation condition
of some rule in c is satisﬁed, and has the goal corresponding to that re-evaluation
condition; where the termination condition is that the goal part of some conven-
tion rule is satisﬁed.
More formally:
Deﬁnition 8 If c =
f(ρk,γk)|k ∈
f1,…,l
g
g is a convention, then:
(J-Commit g ϕψpre c)
def = ∀i ⋅( i ∈ g)⇒pre∧ A((p ∨ q)
U r)
where
p
def = (Goal i ϕ) q
def =
Wk
l=1(Bel i ρl)∧A[(Goal i γl)
U r] r
def =
Wk
m=1γm.
7This general model can be used to capture the properties of many different types of joint
commitment. For example, we will now specify a social convention that is similar to the
Levesque-Cohen model of joint persistent goals (JPGs) [10]. Let
preJPG
def = ¬(Bel i ϕ)∧( Bel i E
￿ϕ)
cJPG
def =
 
 
 
 
 
((Bel i ϕ),(M-Bel g ϕ)),
((Bel i A ¬ϕ),(M-Bel g A ¬ϕ)),
((Bel i ¬ψ),(M-Bel g ¬ψ))
 
 
 
 
 
.
A group with a joint commitment parameterised by a pre-condition preJPG, and convention
cJPG will have a shared mental state identical in all important respects to that implied by the
JPGs of Levesque-Cohen. We use joint commitments to deﬁne joint intentions, which are held
by a group g with respect to an action α and motivation ψ. In general, it is possible to make
conventions a parameter of joint intentions. However, this would complicate our subsequent
formalism, and we therefore leave this reﬁnement to future work. For the purposes of this
paper, we simply assume that joint intentions are deﬁned over the JPG-like convention cJPG;
this gives us a model of joint intentions similar to that in [10, p98].
(J-Intend g αψ )
def = (M-Bel g (Agts α g)) ∧
(J-Commit g A
￿(Happens (M-Bel g (Does α))?;α) ψ preJPG cJPG)
Thus a joint intention in g to do α means having a joint commitment that eventually g will
believe α will happen next, and then α happens next. An individual intention by agent i to
do α with motivation ψ is a special case of joint intention.
(Intend i αψ )
def = ∀g ⋅( Singleton gi )⇒( J-Intend g αψ )
4 The Cooperative Problem Solving Process
In this section, we present a four-stage model of CPS, which we formalize by expressing it in
the logic described in §2. The four stages of the model are:
1. Recognition: The CPS process begins when some agent recognises the potential for
cooperative action; this recognition may come about because an agent has a goal that it
is unable to achieve in isolation, or, more generally, because the agent prefers assistance.
2. Teamformation: During this stage, the agent that recognised the potential for cooperat-
ive action at stage (1) solicits assistance. If this stage is successful, then it will end with
a group having a joint commitment to collective action.
3. Plan formation: During this stage, the agents attempt to negotiate a joint plan that they
believe will achieve the desired goal.
4. Team action: During this stage, the newly agreed plan of joint action is executed by the
agents, which maintain a close-knit relationship throughout; this relationship is deﬁned
by an agreed social convention, which every agent follows.
Although we believe that most instances of CPS exhibit these stages in some form, we
stress that the model is idealized. We recognise that there are cases which the model cannot
account for, and we highlight these wherever appropriate. Our aim has been to construct a
8framework that is complete, (in that it describes CPS from beginning to end), but abstract, (in
that details which might obscure more signiﬁcant points have been omitted). One important
simpliﬁcation that we have made is the assumption that CPS is strictly sequential,i nt h a te a c h
stage directly follows that which preceded it, without iteration or backtracking. When CPS
occurs in human societies, it is rarely sequential in this way. We intend to deal with this issue
in future reﬁnements.
4.1 Recognition
CPS begins when some agent in a multi-agent community has a goal, and recognises the
potential for cooperative action with respect to that goal. Recognition may occur for several
reasons:
• Theparadigmcaseisthatinwhich theagentisunabletoachieveitsgoalinisolation, due
toalackofresources, but believesthatcooperativeactioncanachieveit. For example, an
agent may have a goal that, to achieve, requires information only accessible to another
agent; without the cooperation of this other agent, the goal cannot be achieved.
• Alternatively, an agent may have the resources to achieve the goal, but does not want
to use them. There may be several reasons for this: it may believe that in working alone
on this particular problem, it will clobber one of its other goals, or it may believe that a
cooperative solution will in some way be better (e.g., derived faster, more accurate).
In order to more precisely deﬁne the conditions that characterise the potential for cooperative
action, it is necessary to introduce a number of subsidiary deﬁnitions. First, we require deﬁn-
itions of single- and multi-agent ability: what it means to be able to bring about some state
of the world. Several attempts to deﬁne multi-agent ability have appeared in the literature
(e.g., [14]). However, there is currently no consensus on the appropriateness of these deﬁni-
tions. For this reason, we adapt the well-known model of ability proposed by Moore [11].
Deﬁnition: (Single-agent ability) Agent i can achieve ϕ iff there is some possibly
complex action α of which i is the sole agent, such that either: (i) i knows that
after it performed α, ϕ would be satisﬁed; or (ii) i knows that after it performed
α,i tc o u l da c h i e v eϕ.
Clause (i) is the base case, where an agent knows the identity of an action that will achieve the
goal ϕ directly. Clause (ii) allows for the possibility of an agent performing an action in order
to ﬁnd out how to achieve ϕ.T h i sr e c u r s i v ed e ﬁnition is easily generalized to the multi-agent
case.
Deﬁnition: (Multi-agent ability) Group g can achieve ϕ iff there is some possibly
complex action α and some group g′, such that it is mutually known in g that
g′⊆g,a n dg′ are the agents of α, and it is mutually known in g that either (i) after
α was performed, ϕ would be satisﬁed; or (ii) after α was performed, g would
have the multi-agent ability to achieve ϕ.
Once again, clause (i) represents thebase case, where the group is mutually awareof the iden-
tity of someaction that could be performedby somesubset of thegroup (whose identity must
also be known), such that performing the action would achieve the goal directly. Clause (ii)
is the recursive case, where the group is required to know the identity of some action and
subset of agents such that performing the action would bring them closer to the goal.
Am o r ep r e c i s ed e ﬁnition of potential for cooperation can now be given.
9Deﬁnition: (Potential for cooperation) With respect to agent i’s goal ϕ,t h e r ei s
potential for cooperation iff: (i) there is some group g such that i believes that g
can jointly achieve ϕ; and either (ii) i can’t achieve ϕ in isolation; or (iii) i believes
that for every action α that it could perform which achieves ϕ, it has a goal of not
performing α.
Note that in clause (i), an agent needs to know the identity of a group that it believes can
cooperatetoachieve itsgoal. This isanoverstrongassumption. It precludes anagentattempt-
ing to ﬁnd out the identity of a group that can achieve the goal, and it does not allow an agent
to simply broadcast its goal in the hope of attracting help (as in the CNET [15]). However,
catering for these cases would complicate the formalization a good deal, and obscure some
more important points. We therefore leave such reﬁnements to future work.
The ideas introduced above are readily expressed using the language we described in §2.
First, we write (Can i ϕ) iff i can achieve ϕ in isolation.
(Can i ϕ)
def = ∃α ⋅( Know i (Agt α i)∧( Achieves αϕ )) ∨
∃α ⋅( Know i (Agt α i)∧( Achieves α (Can i ϕ)))
Multi-agent ability is a generalization of single-agent ability.
(J-Can g ϕ)
def = ∃α ⋅∃ g′⋅( M-Know g (g′⊆g)∧( Agts α g′) ∧ (Achieves αϕ )) ∨
∃α ⋅∃ g′⋅( M-Know g (g′⊆g)∧( Agts α g′) ∧ (Achieves α (J-Can g ϕ)))
We can now formally state the conditions that characterise the potential for cooperation.
(PfC i ϕ)
def = (Goal i ϕ)∧∃ g ⋅( Bel i (J-Can g ϕ)) ∧
 
¬(Can i ϕ)∨
(Bel i ∀α ⋅( Agt α i)∧( Achieves αϕ )⇒( Goal i (Doesn’t α)))
 
4.2 Team Formation
Havingidentiﬁedthepotentialforcooperativeactionwithrespecttooneofitsgoals, arational
agent will solicit assistance from some group of agents that it believes can achieve the goal. If
the agent is successful, then at the conclusion of this team formation stage, the agent will have
brought about a mental state wherein the group has a joint commitment to collective action.
(There will not yet be a joint intention to act; this comes later.) An agent cannot guarantee that
it will be successful in forming a team; it can only attempt it. We adapt the model of attempts
developed by Cohen-Levesque [4, p240].
Deﬁnition: (Attempts) An attempt by agent i to bring about a state ϕ is an action
α performed by i with the goal that after α is performed, ϕ is satisﬁed, or at least
ψ is satisﬁed.
The ultimate goal of the attempt — the thing that i hopes to bring about — is represented by
ϕ,w h e r e a sψ represents ‘what it takes to make an honest effort’ [4, p240]. If i is successful,
then bringing about ψ will be sufﬁcient to cause ϕ.
Theteam formation stagecan then becharacterised as an assumption madeabout rational
agents: namely, thatan agent which recognises the potential for cooperativeaction will solicit
assistance.
10Assumption: (Team formation) An agent i, who believes that there is potential
for cooperative action with respect to its goal ϕ, will eventually attempt to bring
aboutin somegroup g, (that it believescan jointly achieve ϕ), a statewherein: (i) it
is mutually believed in g that g can jointly achieve ϕ,a n dg are jointly committed
toteam action with respect toi’s goal ϕ; or, failing that, to at least cause in g (ii) the
mutual beliefthat i has a goal of ϕ and the mutual belief that i believesg can jointly
achieve ϕ.
Part (i) represents the commitment that the group has towards i’s goal ϕ if i is successful
in its attempt to solicit assistance; we discuss what team action means in §4.4. Note that
an agent might have its own reasons for agreeing to participate in a cooperative action, that
are unconnected with the request by the agent that recognises the potential for cooperation.
However, we have not attempted to deal with such cases here.
The team formation assumption implicitly states that agents are veracious with respect to
their goals, i.e., thattheywill try toinﬂuence the group byrevealing their true goal. We do not
consider cases where agents are mendacious (i.e., they lie about their goals), or when agents
do not reveal their goals. (We refer the interested reader to [7, pp159–165] for a discussion
and formalization of these considerations.)
We write
fAttempt i αϕψ
g for an attempt by i to achieve ϕ by performing α,a tl e a s t
achieving ψ. Following Cohen-Levesque, we use curly brackets to indicate that attempts are
complex actions, not predicates [4, p240].
fAttempt i αϕψ
g
def =
 
 
 
(Bel i ¬ϕ)∧( Agt α i)∧
(Goal i (Achieves αϕ )) ∧
(Intend i (Does α;ψ?))
 
 
 ?;α
We introduce an abbreviation to simplify subsequent formalization: (Pre-Team g ϕ i) means
that (i) g mutually believe that they can jointly achieve ϕ; and (ii) g are jointly committed to
becoming a team with respect to i’s goal ϕ.
(Pre-Team g ϕ i)
def = (M-Bel g (J-Can g ϕ)) ∧
(J-Commit g (Team g ϕ i)( Goal i ϕ) preJPG cJPG)
(Team is deﬁned in §4.4.) The main assumption concerning teamformation can now bestated.
Assumption 1 |= ∀i ⋅( Bel i (PfC i ϕ)) ⇒ A
￿∃g ⋅∃ α ⋅( Happens
fAttempt i α pq
g) where
p
def = (Pre-Team g ϕ i)
q
def = (M-Bel g (Goal i ϕ)∧( Bel i (J-Can g ϕ))).
If teamformation is successful then for the ﬁrst time there will be a social mental state relating
to i’s goal, which contrasts with i’s individual perspective that has guided the process until
this stage.
4.3 Plan Formation
If an agent is successful in its attempt to solicit assistance, then there will be a group of agents
with a joint commitment to collective action. But collective action cannot begin until the
group agree on what they will actually do. Hence the next stage in the CPS process: plan
formation.
11We saw above that a group will not form a collective unless they believe they can actually
achieve the desired goal. This, in turn, implies that there is at least one action that is known to
the group that will take them ‘closer’ to thegoal (see the deﬁnition of J-Can, above). However,
it is possible that there are many agents that know of actions the group can perform in order
to take the collective closer to, or even achieve the goal. Moreover, some members of the
collective may have objections to one or more of these actions. For example, an agent may
believe that a particular action has hitherto unforeseen and damaging consequences. It is
therefore necessary for the collective to come to some agreement about exactly which course
of action they will follow. Negotiation is the mechanism via which such agreement is reached.
Negotiation usually involves agents making reasoned arguments for and against courses
of action; making proposals and counter proposals; suggesting modiﬁcations or amendments
to plans; and continuing in this way until all the negotiators have reached agreement2.N e -
gotiation has long been recognised as a process of some importance for DAI (see, e.g., [16]).
Unfortunately, analyses of negotiation demonstrate that it is also extremely complex — a rig-
orous attempt at formalization is quite beyond the scope of this paper3. Instead, we simply
offer some observations about the weakest conditions under which negotiation can be said
to have occurred.
What can we say about negotiating a plan? First, we note that negotiation may fail:t h e
collective maysimply be unable to reachagreement, due to some irreconcilable differences. In
this case, the minimum condition required for us to be able to say that negotiation occurred
at all is that at least one agent proposed a course of action that it believed would take the
collective closer to the goal. However, negotiation may also succeed. In this case, we expect
a team action stage to follow — we shall say no more about team action here, as this is the
subject of the next section.
We can make a number of other tentative assumptions about the behaviour of agents
during negotiation. Most importantly, we might assume that they will attempt to bring about
their preferences. For example, if an agent has an objection to some plan, then it will attempt
to prevent this plan being carried out. Similarly, if it has a preference for some plan, then it
will attempt to bring this plan about.
We shall now make the above discussion more precise. First, we deﬁne joint attempts:
what it means for a group of agents to collectively attempt something. As might be expected,
joint attempts are a generalization of single-agent attempts.
Deﬁnition: (Joint attempts) An attempt by a group of agents g to bring about
a state ϕ is an action α,o fw h i c hg are the agents, performed with the mutual
goal that after α is performed, ϕ is satisﬁed, or at least ψ is satisﬁed (where ψ
represents what it takes to make a reasonable effort).
Next, we state the minimum conditions required for negotiation to have occurred.
Assumption: (Negotiation) If group g are apre-team with respect toagent i’sgoal
ϕ,t h e ng will eventually jointly attempt to bring about a state where it is mutually
known in g that g are a team with respect to i’s goal ϕ, or, failing that, to at least
bring about a state where some agent j ∈ g has made g mutually aware of its belief
that some action α can be performed by g in order to achieve ϕ.
In otherwords, the group will try tobring about a statewhere they haveagreed on acommon
plan, and intend to act on it. Failing that, they will bring about a state where at least one of
them has proposed a plan that it believed would achieve the desired goal. The other, more
tentative assumptions about agent behaviour during negotiation are as follows.
2It may also involve agents lying,or being cunningand devious, thoughwe shallnot consider suchcaseshere.
3See [9] for preliminary work on logical models of argumentation.
12Assumption: (Making preferencesknown) If group g are apre-teamwith respect
to agent i’s goal ϕ,a n dt h e r ei ss o m ea c t i o nα such that it is mutually believed in
g that α achieves ϕ,a n dt h a tg are the agents of α,t h e ne v e r ya g e n tj ∈ g that has
a preference that α does/does not occur will attempt to ensure that α does/does
not occur, by at least making g mutually aware of its preference for/against α.
We are once again assuming that agents are veracious, in that they attempt to inﬂuence the
team by revealing their true preferences, rather than by lying, or concealing their true prefer-
ences.
We begin by formalizing joint attempts.
fJ-Attempt g αϕψ
g
def =
 
 
 
(M-Bel g ¬ϕ)∧( Agts α g)∧
(M-Goal g (Achieves αϕ )) ∧
(J-Intend g (Does α;ψ?))
 
 
 ?;α
The main assumption characterising negotiation can now be given. (Team is deﬁned below.)
Assumption 2 |= (Pre-Team g ϕ i)⇒A
￿∃α ⋅( Happens
fJ-Attempt g α pq
g) where
p
def = (M-Know g (Team g ϕ i))
q
def = ∃j ⋅∃ α ⋅( j ∈ g)∧( M-Bel g (Bel j (Agts α g)∧( Achieves αϕ ))).
To formalize the assumption that members make their preferences known, we need to capture
the notion of an agent trying to cause and trying to prevent a group performing an action.
(Try-to-cause igα)
def = ∃α′⋅A(Happens
fAttempt i α′( Does α)( M-Bel g (Goal i (Does α)))
g)
The deﬁnition of (Try-to-prevent igα) is similar to Try-to-cause, and is therefore omitted.
Assumption 3 Agents that have a preference for some action make the team mutually aware
of their preference:
|= ∀g ⋅∀ i ⋅∀ α ⋅( Pre-Team g ϕ i)∧( M-Bel g (Agts α g)∧( Achieves αϕ )) ⇒
[∀j ⋅( j ∈ g)∧( Goal j (Does α)) ⇒ (Try-to-cause jgα)].
Agents that prefer some action not to be performed make the team mutually aware of their
preference:
|= ∀g ⋅∀ i ⋅∀ α ⋅( Pre-Team g ϕ i)∧( M-Bel g (Agts α g)∧( Achieves αϕ )) ⇒
[∀j ⋅( j ∈ g)∧( Goal j (Doesn’t α)) ⇒ (Try-to-prevent jgα)].
If plan formation is successful then the team will have a joint commitment to the goal, and
will have agreed to the means by which they will pursue this goal. Ideally, we would like to
specify that the group also negotiate a convention for monitoring team action. Unfortunately,
we have no direct way of representing such behaviour: it would require quantiﬁcation over
formulae of the language, and such a meta-level notion cannot be represented at the object
level in a normal modal language such as that used here (see §5).
134.4 Team Action
If a collective is successful in its attempt to negotiate a plan, then we expect that collective
to follow up negotiation with action. This gives us the fourth, and ﬁnal stage in our model:
team action. For this stage, we simply require that the team jointly intend some appropriate
action.
Deﬁnition: (Team action) Ag r o u pg are considered a team with respect to i’s
goal ϕ iff there is some action α,s u c ht h a t :( i )α achieves ϕ; and (ii) g have a joint
intention of α,r e l a t i v et oi having a goal of ϕ.
The formalization of Team is simple.
(Team g ϕ i)
def = ∃α ⋅( Achieves αϕ )∧( J-Intend g α (Goal i ϕ))
From the deﬁnition of J-Intend, we know that the group will remain committed to mutually
believing they are about to perform the action, and then performing it. Moreover, if ever
one of them comes to believe, for example, that i no longer has a goal of ϕ, then the social
convention dictates that the agent will make the team awareof this, and team action will end.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have presented an abstract formal model of cooperative problem solving,
which describes all aspects of the process, from recognition of the potential for cooperation
through to team action. This model considers a number of issues that have hitherto been
neglected by DAI theorists. For example, it deﬁnes the conditions under which there is po-
tential for cooperativeaction, and shows how an agent’s individual mental state can lead it to
attemptto build a social mental state in a group. The modelhas a number of other properties,
which we shall brieﬂy discuss in this section.
Although we have not explicitly considered communication, our model is nevertheless
consistent withone of the best current theories of speechacts: in [4], Cohen-Levesque proposed
a theory in which illocutionary acts are treated as attempts to bring about some mental state in
aconversationparticipant. Ata number ofpoints, our modelpredictsprecisely such attempts;
for example, the model predicts that an agent which recognises the potential for cooperation
will attempt to bring about a joint commitment to collective action in some group that it
believes can achieve its goal.
Another interesting property is that the model consists of a set of liveness properties [12].
This isconsistent withthe view ofagentsasintelligentreactivesystems,r e s p o n d i n gi nareasoned
way to their goals, and events that occur in their environment.
The model also predicts that agents will attempt to initiate social interaction if they have
goals that are dependent on other community members. In order to do this, the agents must
have some knowledge about the abilities, skills, and interests of their acquaintances.
Finally, the model predicts that once a group of agents are formed into a collective, they
will attempt to negotiate a plan that they believe will achieve the desired objective. Moreover,
they will make their preferences known with respect to such plans, and are not required
simply toacceptanotheragent’sproposals; theyarethus autonomous, ratherthanbenevolent.
Therearea number of issues thatweintend toaddress in future work, themost obvious of
which is the need for reﬁnement of the model, as highlighted in the main text. Additionally,
there are a number of ways in which the language we have used for representing the model
needs to be extended. The two most signiﬁcant points are the need to quantify over complex
action expressions, and the need to be able to represent meta-level notions at the object level.
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